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TEACHING LAW STUDENTS TO COMFORT THE 
TROUBLED AND TROUBLE THE COMFORTABLE:†
Robert Hornstein
 
AN ESSAY ON THE PLACE OF POVERTY LAW IN THE 
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
††
When Sorrow walked with me.
 
 
I walked a mile with Pleasure; 
She chattered all the way, 
But left me none the wiser 
For all she had to say. 
 
I walked a mile with Sorrow 
And ne’er a word said she; 
But oh, the things I learned from her 
1
In September of 2008, Associate Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia addressed a gathering of the Federalist Society at 





       †     Steven Banks, the Attorney-in-Chief of the Legal Aid Society in New York 
City, used this phrase in an interview he gave to journalist Elizabeth Kolbert in 
1999 for an article in The New Yorker magazine about the plans of New York City 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to throw uncooperative families out of New York City’s 
homeless shelters.  See Elizabeth Kolbert, Around City Hall, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 
17, 1999, at 40.  Banks used the phrase to describe his work as a poverty lawyer 
representing New York City’s homeless.  See id. 
       ††    Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.  The author 
thanks Professor Christopher Roderer, Daniel Atkins, and Maria Soto for their 
many valuable comments. Special thanks to my wife, Corrine Hornstein, for 
tirelessly reading the earlier drafts and for her wise insights. 
 
 1. Robert Browning Hamilton, Along the Road, in FIRST LOVES: POETS 
INTRODUCE THE ESSENTIAL POEMS THAT CAPTIVATED & INSPIRED THEM 27 (2002). 
 2. Abdon M. Pallasch, Scalia Says U. of C. Has Gone Liberal, CHI. SUN TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.suntimes.com/news/education/ 
1168064,scalia091708.article. 
  In his address, Scalia reminisced 
about his days as a law student and shared with his audience that 
1
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when he was in law school, he “took nothing but bread-and-butter 
classes, not ‘Law and Poverty,’ or other made-up stuff.”3  Justice 
Scalia also counseled his audience on what courses he thinks law 
students should be taking in law school.4  According to Justice 
Scalia, law students should “take serious classes.”5  As for the 
rewards of taking a course such as poverty law, he cautioned: 
“Don’t waste your time.”6  So, in sharing this advice, did Justice 
Scalia in some way mean to suggest that the legal interests of the 
poor should rightfully occupy a peripheral, or perhaps even 
inferior, place in legal education and the legal system?  Regrettably, 
this may be the case.7
Justice Scalia has previously signaled how he values the legal 
interests of the poor.  His dissenting opinion in Legal Services 
Corporation v. Velazquez
   
8 offers a measure of insight into where he 
would place his thumb on the scales of justice in weighing the 
poor’s legal interests, and in particular, how Justice Scalia calibrates 
equal access to legal counsel for the poor.  In Velazquez, the Court 
struck down a legislative restriction that prohibited federally 
funded Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) program lawyers from 
undertaking representation in cases that involve “an effort to 
amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.”9  The LSC 
promulgated a regulation that prohibited LSC lawyers from 
challenging the constitutionality of welfare laws on behalf of their 
impoverished clients.10  Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, rejected the argument that the statutory provision 
prohibiting LSC lawyers from raising constitutional challenges was 
essentially harmless because the LSC lawyer could withdraw from 
representation.11
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence and the Good Society: 
Shades of Felix Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950’s, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1801 (1991) (describing how Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence of neutral principles often results in a lack of judicial protection for 
the poor); Toby Golick, Justice Scalia, Poverty and the Good Society, 12 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1817, 1817–18 (1991) (arguing Justice Scalia’s conception of the proper 
arrangement of our governmental structure precludes the poor from seeking aid 
from the courts in enforcing statutory rights to governmental benefits). 
 8. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 9. Id. at 537. 
 10. Id. at 538–39. 
 11. Id. at 546. 
  Justice Kennedy found the remedy of withdrawal 
2
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“even more problematic because in cases where the attorney 
withdraws from a representation, the client is unlikely to find other 
counsel.”12  The likelihood of such a result troubled Justice 
Kennedy because the “explicit premise for providing LSC attorneys 
is the necessity to make available representation ‘to persons 
financially unable to afford legal assistance.’”13
Writing in dissent, however, Justice Scalia was not troubled by 
the possibility that an impoverished person could not find 
substitute counsel.  According to Justice Scalia, the possibility that a 
poor person would be unable to retain substitute counsel “is surely 
irrelevant, since it leaves the welfare recipient in no worse condition 
than he would have been in had the LSC program never been 
enacted [because] . . . even if welfare claimants cannot obtain a 
lawyer anywhere else, the Government is not required to provide 
one.”
 
14  For Justice Scalia, no matter how severely the statutory 
restriction trenches upon the ability of LSC lawyers to provide an 
equal measure of meaningful representation for the poor, there 
nevertheless is no constitutional foul.15  This is so since in the first 
instance, the poor’s access to legal counsel through the LSC is 
nothing more or less than a matter of legislative grace.16
Justice Scalia’s view that poverty law is not a serious course 
echoes a nagging truth: poverty law and the broader concern of 
social justice have always held a sort of second-class citizenship 
within the modern architecture of the law school curriculum and 




 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2996a(3) (2001)). 
 14. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
  The historical pedigree of Justice 
 17. See, e.g., M. H. Hoeflich, Symposium, Introduction, 38 EMORY L.J. 565, 568–
70 (1989) (explaining poverty law is not as promising a field of study for 
theoretical scholarship and is usually considered peripheral to the core 
curriculum); Emily J. Sack, The Burial of Family Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 459, 479 n.128 
(2008) (explaining that one of family law’s characteristics as a gender-identified 
course is that, like poverty law, it traditionally has been considered “softer” law, as 
compared to core subjects such as constitutional law, evidence and corporations); 
Amy L. Wax, Symposium, Musical Chairs and Tall Buildings: Teaching Poverty Law in 
the 21st Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1363 (2008) (stating that “[p]overty 
has never been considered a mainstream part of the law school curriculum; nor 
has it commanded a central place in legal scholarship.”).  See also Jerold S. 
Auerbach, What Has the Teaching of Law to Do with Justice?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 
471 (1978) (discussing how clinical professors “seem to float at the margin of their 
professional culture” and “are considered less intellectual and less academic”); 
Steven K. Berenson, A Primer for New Civil Law Clinic Students, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
3
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Scalia’s view is inextricably bound up with the question of the 
proper role and function of law schools, and for that matter, the 
law itself.18  Poverty law, while having both a doctrinal and clinical 
presence in the academy and the law school curriculum for several 
decades now, has yet to enjoy complete academic acceptance.19  To 
this day, it continues to occupy what has been described as a 
peripheral presence in the law school curriculum.20
Rather than being consigned to the margins of the law school 
curriculum, however, poverty law and social justice should be 
prominent fixtures in legal education and should be central 
institutional concerns of the nation’s law schools.  More precisely, 
poverty law should be a required and animating element of today’s 
law school curriculum.  The reasons why are drawn not from the 
classroom but from the pages of history and the pressing demands 
of civil society.  In a political instant, hundreds of billions of dollars 
in corporate welfare is dispensed to the architects of the subprime 
mortgage crisis and to our nation’s largest banks and insurers,
 
21 but 
years are devoted to debating the wisdom of providing poor 
families and children with a stronger safety net.22  For decades, 
corporate chief executives were handsomely rewarded for 
leadership that resulted in harm to their companies and the loss of 
thousands of jobs.23
 
603, 625 (2007) (noting that historically, clinical legal education has had a 
subordinate status in the academy). 
 18. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Enough?, 
17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 583, 583, 591 (1998) (questioning whether law schools are 
“educating students for technical proficiency, but failing to inculcate in them a 
proper sense of their social and public responsibilities as members of the legal 
profession” and arguing that “law schools, and particularly law teachers, have a 
‘moral responsibility’ to democratize our legal culture.”) [hereinafter Wizner, Is 
Learning]. 
 19. See Hoeflich, supra note 17, at 570; Wax, supra note 17, at 1363. 
 20. See Hoeflich, supra note 17, at 570; Wax, supra note 17, at 1363. 
 21. See Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Insurers and Automakers in Time for 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B1; Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Insurers 
Are Getting in Line for Piece of Federal Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B1; Bob 
Herbert, Op-Ed., Lost in a Flood of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at A17; Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, G.M. Speeds Hat in Hand to Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, at B1.  
See also David Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 
(2004) (detailing the debate surrounding the passage of 1996 welfare reform); 
Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Swarm of Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A23; Julie 
Scelfo, After the House Is Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at D1. 
 22. See Peter S. Goodman, From Welfare Shift in ’96, ’08 Reminder for Clinton, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at A1; Rachel L. Swarns, State Programs Add Safety Net for 
the Poorest, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2008, at Al. 
  But only now that the nation faces economic 
 23. See Jenny Anderson, Congress Questions Executives on Pay, N.Y. TIMES, 
4
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collapse has this paradox of executive performance and 
compensation been called into serious question.  Nearly thirty-
seven million Americans live in poverty and many millions more 
dwell within a week’s wage of poverty.24  The economic peril that 
the country currently faces reveals the fragility of our conventional 
measures and definitions of poverty.  Around the world, 1.4 billion 
people subsist on slightly more than one dollar a day.25  The 
American worker is more productive than ever before, but more 
economically vulnerable to poverty.26  Over forty-seven million 
Americans lack access to healthcare insurance and millions more 
lack adequate access.27  Beyond the anonymity of these statistics, it 
is possible for a child in America to die for want of access to dental 
care —for no reason other than poverty.28
Before I proceed further, I wish to make three preliminary 
acknowledgments.  First, I want to recognize the rich, textured, and 
elegantly thoughtful body of scholarship on poverty law that has 
been produced over the last five decades.  Consequently, this Essay 
does not arrive on a fresh canvas.  Quite to the contrary, it draws 
upon and benefits greatly from the wisdom and insights of the 
many scholars, both doctrinal and clinical, as well as poverty law 
practitioners, who have contributed to the development of that 
body of work.  For this reason, and as a matter of blunt candor, I 
  These social and 
economic conditions present a compelling tableau of reasons why 
there is both a place in the law school curriculum for the study of 
poverty law, and a pressing and critical educational, professional, 
and public need.  This Essay addresses the role and place of poverty 
law in today’s law school curriculum. 
 
Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/business/07cnd-
pay.html; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Banker Bonuses Are “Shameful,” 
Obama Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1. 
 24. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POVERTY AND HARDSHIP AFFECT 
TENS OF MILLIONS OF AMERICANS (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/12-20-07pov.pdf. 
 25. In August of 2008, the World Bank estimated 1.4 billion people in the 
developing world live on less than $1.25 a day.  The World Bank, New Data Show 
1.4 Billion Live on Less Than US $1.25 a Day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains 
Strong, Aug. 26, 2008, http://go.worldbank.org/K3Z8CEDJI0. 
 26. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Working Poor and Young Are Hit Hard in Economic 
Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A26.  See Steven Greenhouse & David 
Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise in Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, 
at A1. 
 27. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF 
AMERICANS WHO ARE UNINSURED CLIMBS AGAIN (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/8-28-
07pov.pdf.  See also Mary Otto, Hidden Hurt, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2008, at W08. 
 28. Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B1. 
5
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disclaim any pretense of originality.  Second, I make no attempt 
nor lay any claim to providing a full accounting of the literature in 
the narrow space of this Essay.  Third, this Essay is animated as 
much by the experiences that informed my life as a poverty lawyer 
as by pedagogical concerns and interests.   
Returning to Justice Scalia’s appearance at the Chicago Union 
League in September 2008, his explanation of why law students 
should not take courses that address the legal needs of the poor 
puts into clear focus one of the most enduring criticisms of poverty 
law―that it is not a legitimate area of legal study.  For this reason, 
Justice Scalia’s reprove that poverty law is “made-up stuff,”29 offers a 
useful starting point, which is the often difficult matter of defining 
poverty law.  Professor Martha Davis, in her recent article, The 
Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the Old and New Curriculum,30 
which appeared in a recent Symposium issue of the Fordham 
Urban Law Journal on the role of poverty law in today’s law school 
curriculum, noted that almost four decades ago, Professor Thomas 
Quinn began a poverty law teaching conference by posing the 
question: “What is poverty law?”31
Because poverty law is not a core part of a traditional legal 
education, it has no standard, agreed-upon curriculum.  
What is taught in poverty law is up for grabs and is heavily 
influenced by the interests and convictions of the faculty 
instructor.  Not surprisingly, courses are highly variable, 
and their contents have evolved in response to political 
developments and shifting notions on the causes and 
cures of economic disadvantage.
 
Professor Amy Wax, another contributor to the same 
Symposium, observed that: 
32
A third participant in the Symposium, Professor Stephen 





 29. Pallasch, supra note 2. 
 30. Martha F. Davis, Symposium, The Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the 
Old and New Curriculum, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2007). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Wax, supra note 17, at 1364. 
 33. Stephen Loffredo, Symposium, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural 
Constitutional Law Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1240 (2007). 
  Notably, however, each of these three 
observations―by scholars who have written and thought about the 
contours and importance of poverty law for many years―reveals 
that the task of setting out a uniform and universally accepted 
6
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definition of poverty law is probably not achievable in any 
normative sense.   
Nevertheless, as used in this Essay, poverty law is not divorced 
from the formal canonical subjects, structures, and conventions 
that underlie our legal system.  Poverty law instead embraces a 
broad field of substantive and procedural inquiry directed at 
learning and understanding how and why existing legal structures 
and ordinary legal conventions can disadvantage the poor as well as 
what legal mechanisms can aid the poor.  As I use the term 
“poverty law” in this Essay, it embraces teaching students to use 
their technical competencies as lawyers to address and to remediate 
those disadvantages that burden the poor.  And for this reason, 
poverty law, as used in this Essay, necessarily embraces teaching law 
students to care about justice and equality, teaching them that 
justice and equality matter, and to pursue both in the course of 
their lives as lawyers.  As Professor Bryan Stevenson eloquently 
stated, “[t]he opposite of poverty is not wealth,” it is “justice.”34
A broader question, however, is what, if anything, does justice 
have to do with the mission of law schools and legal education?
  
This simple truth lies at the heart of any definition of poverty law. 
35  
Legal education for the past three centuries has been neither a 
fixed or static process.36
 
 34. Andrea Saenz, Hundreds Gather for Celebration of Public Interest, HARV. L. 
RECORD, Mar. 20, 2008, at News, available at http://media.www.hlrecord. 
org/media/storage/paper609/news/2008/03/20/News/Hundreds.Gather.For.C
elebration.Of.Public.Interest-3278485.shtml. 
 35. Three decades ago, Professor Jerold Auerbach examined this question in 
an insightful article entitled What Has the Teaching of Law To Do with Justice?.  See 
generally Auerbach, supra note 17. 
 36. See generally Talbot D’Alemberte, Teaching About Justice and Social 
Contributions, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 363 (1992); Russell Engler, From 10 to 20: A Guide 
to Utilizing the MacCrate Report Over the Next Decade, 23 PACE L. REV. 519 (2003); 
Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law 
Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. 
the Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 
34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1998); John O. Sonsteng, Donna Ward, Colleen Bruce & 
Michael Petersen, A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-
First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303 (2007); Stephen Wizner, What Is a Law 
School?, 38 EMORY L.J. 701 (1989); ABA, Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar, MacCrate Report, An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task 
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, July 1992, 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html. 
  While law schools in many respects have 
been tradition bound regarding both the content of the standard 
curriculum and the academic study model of legal education, the 
last few decades have witnessed a number of significant changes.  
7
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Lawyering skills, clinical and externship programs, the expansion 
of elective courses, the establishment of legal writing programs, a 
greater emphasis on professionalism, and a movement toward 
bridging the gap between doctrinal instruction and skills 
instruction are all easily recognizable signposts in virtually every 
American law school today.37  Law schools, members of the 
academy, and other interested stakeholder organizations continue 
to recognize that new approaches are needed to educate and 
prepare law students for the practice of law.38  Yet, while the precise 
contours of the standard curriculum have and continue to undergo 
change, curricular change has not yet led to a full embrace or 
endorsement of a social justice mission for law schools.  Professor 
William Quigley argues that social justice is a “counter-cultural 
value” in law school and the legal profession.39
 
 37. See generally Kara Abramson, “Art for a Better Life:” A New Image of American 
Legal Education, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 227 (2006); Jessica Dopierala, Bridging the 
Gap Between Theory and Practice: Why Are Students Falling Off the Bridge and What Are 
Law Schools Doing to Catch Them?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 429 (2008); Robert A. 
Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REV 945 (1991); Nicholas S. 
Zeppos, 2007 Symposium on the Future of Legal Education, 60 VAND. L. REV. 325 
(2007). 
 38. See, e.g., Symposium, Taking Law and ___ Really Seriously: Before, During and 
After “The Law,” 60 VAND. L. REV. 555 (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (prepared by 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching) [hereinafter 
CARNEGIE STUDY].  The Carnegie Study found that “law schools could benefit from 
ideas drawn from the education of physicians, teachers, nurses, engineers, and 
clergy . . . .”  Id. at 185.  The authors of the study highlighted the absence of a 
sufficiently strong bridge between legal thinking and the application of that 
knowledge to day-to-day practice concerns.  Id. at 188.  A second key limitation is a 
lack of attention to developing “the ethical and social dimensions of the 
profession.”  Id.  While the study does not address social justice or poverty law as a 
separate element, it does examine the need for the educational process to account 
for the moral and ethical development of students in the context of what the 
authors describe as the “apprenticeship of professionalism.”  Id. at 126–39.  In this 
context, the study touches briefly on the potential of pro bono work as an 
ingredient in the calculus of students’ moral development.  Id. at 138.  See also 
Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps 
We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 115 (2001) (quoting Gary Bellow, 
On Talking Tough to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33 LEGAL EDUC. 619, 622 
(1983)) (explaining that by the mid-1980s, then current methods of education 
“‘[did] not properly prepare students to practice law.’”); Irene Scharf, Nourishing 
Justice and the Continuum: Implementing a Blended Model in an Immigration Law Clinic, 
12 CLINICAL L. REV. 243, 274 (2005) (noting that students who participate in the 
Southern New England School of Law Immigration Law Clinic “experience . . . the 
variety of practices that characterize effective lawyering.”). 
 39. William P. Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 
1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 9–11 (2007). 
 
8
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Almost two decades ago, Professor David Barnhizer authored 
an article entitled “The Justice Mission of Law Schools.”40  He 
began by observing that “[m]ost faculty in American law schools 
would deny the appropriateness of any mission that requires them 
to either understand or advance justice.”41  Professor Barnhizer 
explained further that the minority of faculty who, at that time, 
would support the idea that social justice is a proper mission of law 
schools “would dissipate abruptly if anyone attempted to be specific 
in terms of the obligation.”42
Much, if not most of what we celebrate as a people is anchored 
to our devotion to the law and the enduring struggle to achieve a 
more just society.  From our founding as a nation, to our rebirth in 
1865, and continuing through the modern civil rights era, the most 
distinctive ingredient of our national ethos has been a maturing 
concern for justice.  The current struggle over extending a full 
measure of civil rights to gay men and women, including 
guaranteeing them full participation in our civil institutions, 
reflects our continuing national discourse on justice.
  While both of Professor Barnhizer’s 
observations are probably as true today as they were nearly two 
decades ago, the case for making justice a core concern of legal 
education remains compelling. 
43
 
 40. David Barnhizer, The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 285 (1992). 
 41. Id. at 286.  See also Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 583 (discussing 
how many law professors would claim that moral instruction is inappropriate and 
arguing “most law school graduates . . . [enter] the profession with only the 
vaguest sense of their . . . obligations to the public.”). 
 42. Barnhizer, supra note 40, at 286 n.3.  The Carnegie Study observed that 
“efforts to add new requirements are almost universally resisted, not only in legal 
education but in professional education generally . . . .”  CARNEGIE STUDY, supra 
note 38, at 190. 
 43. See Patrick Healy, Hopefuls Differ as They Reject Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2008, at A1 (discussing the same-sex marriage views of then Senator Barack 
Obama and Senator John McCain); Jessie McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 
States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1 (discussing the passage of 
same-sex marriage bans in Arizona, California, and Florida).  See also In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (stating that “limiting the designation of 
marriage to a union ‘between a man and a woman’ [in California’s state statute] is 
unconstitutional . . . .”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 
(Conn. 2008) (“[G]ay persons are entitled to marry the . . . same sex partner of 
their choice.”); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 
(Mass. 2003) (“Limiting the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage 
to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of individual liberty and 
equality under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.”). 
  If this is 
indeed true, then it would seem that justice has a great deal to do 
9
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with the mission of law schools.44  Technical and professional 
competency divorced from an understanding and concern for 
justice produces a profession ill prepared to respond to the 
“concrete realities” of the human condition.45  And a lack of 
interest in the latter produces and perpetuates the type of social 
and economic conditions that tear at the very foundations of our 
democracy.  The analytical, technical, and practice skills that form 
the centerpiece of a legal education should be informed by a 
concern for justice.  Almost four decades ago, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly46
 
 44. See John O. Calmore, “Chasing the Wind”: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming 
Legal Mis-Education, and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167 (2004) (noting “social justice is imperative for lawyers to 
heed their public calling in the truest sense.”); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting 
Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 
CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 38–39 (1995) (discussing various arguments that “support the 
notion that lessons of social justice are a necessary part of legal education 
generally, and clinical education in particular.”). 
 45. Justice Brennan used the term, “concrete realities,” to explain his 
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), as “an expression of the 
importance of passion in governmental conduct, in the sense of attention to the 
concrete human realities at stake.”  William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and 
“The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 20 (1988).  See also Steven Wizner, 
Passion in Legal Argument and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Comment on Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 179, 179 (1988) (quoting Brennan, supra at 11) (noting 
that “judging . . . involves the interaction of reason and passion, of logic and 
experience, in a ‘dialogue between head and heart.’”). 
 46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 gave eloquent voice to the social and 
moral conundrum of poverty amidst plenty.  In Goldberg, Justice 
William Brennan, writing for the majority, explained: 
From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has 
been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons 
within its borders.  We have come to recognize that forces 
not within the control of the poor contribute to their 
poverty. This perception, against the background of our 
traditions, has significantly influenced the development of 
the contemporary public assistance system.  Welfare, by 
meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring 
within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that 
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the 
life of the community.  At the same time, welfare guards 
against the societal malaise that may flow from a 
widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity.  
Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to  
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“promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”47
Goldberg v. Kelly, however, offers us more than just an eloquent 
and thoughtful expression of the role and responsibility of 
government to act for the good of its people—it also teaches us 
about lawyering and the public good.  That is, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Goldberg teaches us that injustice and poverty are 
inextricably linked.  Justice Hugo Black, who dissented in Goldberg, 
offered sharp disagreement with the majority’s recourse to the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a source for procedural protections for 
the poor.
 
48  Justice Black also expressed great alarm over what he 
saw as an unwarranted intrusion into a field of state operation.49  
Nevertheless, Justice Black recognized the pressing need to address 
what he described as “[t]he dilemma of the ever-increasing poor in 
the midst of constantly growing affluence . . . .”50
No doubt, the call for our law schools to take on a social justice 
mission is not a new one.  However, it remains a mission that has 
yet to be accepted by most law schools.  Charles Hamilton 
Houston’s stewardship of Howard University Law School offers the 
clearest, if not the best, example of what can be accomplished 
when a law school is institutionally committed to social justice.
 
51  
Houston inculcated his students at Howard with the importance of 
lawyering for the public good and prepared and trained his 
students to challenge and dismantle segregation.52  Thurgood 
Marshall,53 Robert Carter,54 Oliver Hill,55
 
 47. Id. at 264–65.  Justice Scalia, however, would characterize this type of 
decision-making as “abstract moralizing.”  See Bradley Vasoli, Scalia Lambasts 
“Abstract Moralizing,” PHILADELPHIA BULL., Oct. 28, 2008, at 3. 
 48. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 275–77 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 279. 
 50. Id. at 272. 
 51. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 128–145 (Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc. 1976).  See also MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–61 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994). 
 52. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles Hamilton 
Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
17, 21–22 (1998) (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 595, 
599 (1993)) (noting that Houston’s “unrelenting vision of creating a school for the 
training of ‘Black lawyers who would actively and aggressively represent and 
advocate for the rights of the Black citizenry . . . .’”).  See also KLUGER, supra note 
51, at 128 (“Howard Law School became a living laboratory where civil-rights law 
was invented by teamwork.”). 
 and Spottswood 
 53. Thurgood Marshall graduated first in his class at Howard Law School and 
later became the chief attorney and legal strategist for the NAACP in the fight to 
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Robinson56 all studied at Howard under Charles Hamilton 
Houston.57  Each of these men went on to change the course of our 
nation’s history by using their legal training as lawyers for the 
NAACP in its historic fight to help dismantle Jim Crow 
segregation.58  Professor Linda Greene, who explored the social 
mission of law schools nearly twenty years ago, pointed to the work 
of Jean and Edgar Cahn at Antioch Law School as another example 
“of the possibility of a law school’s institutional responsibility for 
justice.”59  The Cahns, who were the founding co-deans, established 
Antioch Law School to provide access to underserved, 
impoverished communities and used clinical education as a key 
ingredient in their educational model.60
 
end segregation.  KLUGER, supra note 51, at 128, 214.  Marshall went on to argue 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  President John F. Kennedy 
appointed Marshall to the federal appellate bench in 1961, and four years later 
President Lyndon Johnson convinced Marshall to step down and serve as Solicitor 
General.  KLUGER, supra note 51, at 760.  Two years later, President Johnson made 
the historic nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Supreme 
Court.  In 1967, Marshall became the first African American to serve on the high 
court.  Id. 
 54. Robert Carter, like Thurgood Marshall, was a graduate of Howard 
University’s law school.  JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A 
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 34 (Basic 
Books 1994).  Carter was Thurgood Marshall’s first assistant counsel at the Legal 
Defense Fund.  Id.  Carter would later be appointed to the federal bench as a 
United States District Court Judge in New York.  KLUGER, supra note 51, at 775. 
 55. Oliver Hill graduated in 1933 from Howard University Law School.  JAMES 
T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS 
TROUBLED LEGACY 28 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).  Hill was one of only a handful of 
African Americans admitted to the Virginia Bar in the 1950s.  See KLUGER, supra 
note 51, at 128.  Hill was counsel in a number of major Legal Defense Fund school 
segregation cases in Virginia.  Id.  He would become the first African American 
elected to the city council of Richmond, Virginia.  Id. 
 56. Spottswood Robinson, III was another Howard Law School graduate who 
was an important participant in many Legal Defense Fund cases.  GREENBERG, 
supra note 54, at 35.  Robinson became dean of Howard’s law school in 1960 and 
was later appointed to the federal appellate bench.  Id. 
 57. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 128, 273, 471.  See also Professor Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Presentation at Great Lawyers and Judges Series, Indiana 
University School of Law—Indianapolis (Feb. 12, 2002) (presenting the life, 
contributions, and influence of Charles Hamilton Houston in the history of the 
United States). 
 58. See GREENBERG, supra note 54, at 26–41. 
 59. Linda Greene, The Justice Mission of the Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
353, 354 (1992). 
 60. Laura C. Lawson, Antioch Law School: Business as Un-usual, 38 NLADA 
BRIEFCASE, 13–14 (Summer 1981). 
  Social justice was the 
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hallmark of Antioch Law School’s educational mission.61
In 2008, the issue of social justice and its role and place in 




. . . Whether law schools, as teachers to the bar, look upon 
their  work as educating public citizens, skilled 
technicians, counselors, advocates, or transformational 
leaders, the infusion of poverty law and poor clients into 
the whole life of the law school offers some hope that 
passion, responsibility, and optimism will win out over 
denial, withdrawal, and skepticism.  That, itself, should be 
worth the candle.
  Professor Marie Failinger, in examining the 
role and place of poverty law in the mission of the law school, offers 
a cautious but hopeful vision for the future: 
[t]he poor in our society, however, pose a compelling 
challenge to the American legal community.  Not only 
have they been the subject of intense academic study, not 
only do they live in one of the richest nations in human 
history (whose social, economic, and educational benefits 
are supposed to trickle down to them), but they also live 
in a country whose dedication to the protection of human 
rights through law is among the highest in history.  In 
such a setting, the widespread existence of the desperate 
poor . . . is a profound moral puzzle. 
63
Despite the fact that for several decades there have been 
continuing calls to take on a social justice mission, the hard truth is 
that these calls have mainly gone unheeded.  Ultimately, however, 
whether law schools and the academy choose to take on this 




 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, Symposium, A Home of Its Own: The Role of 
Poverty Law in Furthering Law Schools’ Missions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1173, 1175 
(2007) (arguing that poverty law can be a key piece in the curriculum of law 
schools that define their mission, at least in part, as educating lawyers as public 
citizens, skilled technicians, skilled counselors, advocates on behalf of a cause, or 
as transformational leaders). 
 63. Id. at 1218. 
  This judgment is a collective one 
 64. See, e.g., Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 591 (“Law schools, and 
particularly law teachers, have a ‘moral responsibility’ to democratize our legal 
culture.  They must teach and inculcate in their students the professional 
obligation of providing and supporting legal services for the poor.”).  See also 
Russell Engler, From the Margins to the Core: Integrating Public Service Legal Work Into 
the Mainstream of Legal Education, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 479, 485 (2006) (“Numerous 
studies reveal the extent to which the values of law students are shaped by their law 
school experiences and those experiences typically push students away from, 
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that has been made not only by law schools and the academy but 
also by the profession.  Inevitably, the path of academic 
achievement in law schools leads to coveted positions with private 
law firms.65  There is a well-traveled path between high academic 
achievement in law school and practice at large firms, both of 
which represent principally corporate and commercial interests.66
Almost ninety years ago in a series of lectures to his first-year 
law students at Columbia University, Professor Karl Llewellyn 
examined the use of the law as a route to material success.
 
67
    There is a brand of lawyer for whom law is the making 
of a livelihood, a competence, a fortune.  Law offers 
means to live, to get ahead.  It is so viewed.  Such men give 
their whole selves to it, in this aspect.  Coin is their 
reward.  Coin makes it possible to live.  Coin is success, 





rather than toward, public interest work.”). 
 65. See Frances Ansley, Starting With the Students: Lessons from Popular Education, 
4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 7, 29 (1994) (pointing out that the traditional 
grading system operates to identify students for large firm work and that 
“placement offices devote a great deal of time and energy to attract large firms for 
interviews and to smooth the path for a select number of . . . graduates into slots in 
those firms.”); Maria L. Ciampi, The I and Thou: A New Dialogue for the Law, 58 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 881, 899 (1990) (“Students frequently compete for the highest grades 
solely to be able to go to the large firms which pay enormous salaries.”); David C. 
Vladeck, Hard Choices: Thoughts for New Lawyers, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 354 
(2001) (observing that the poor’s lack of access to legal counsel “begins in law 
schools, and our nation’s law schools are at least complicit in building the 
hydraulic pressure on young graduates to seek out corporate law firm jobs . . . .”). 
 66. See Vladeck, supra note 65, at 354–55.  See also D’Alemberte, supra note 36, 
at 369–70 (“By screening law students and sorting them out, we legal educators 
ease the burden of selections for law firms.  By socializing law students to think 
that they should go where the ‘interesting work’ is, we precondition them to 
accept this employment.”); Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the 
Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 359, 397 (1990) (“Students are taught—implicitly, if not explicitly—
that to be truly successful, one must earn high grades, write on law review, and 
clerk for prestigious firms during the summer.”); Henry Rose, Law Schools Should 
Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 447–48 (1992) (“Most of the resources 
of the placement offices of American law schools are devoted to assisting students 
find private employment. . . . For most schools, a prime measure of success is the 
percentage of graduates who are initially employed in large, prestigious law 
firms.”). 
 67. See, e.g., K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 
(1960). 
 68. Id. at 141. 
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Nearly eight decades later, this remains true.69  In fact, the 
notion that the law is a pathway to power and prestige is perhaps 
more true today than at any time before.70
Most law schools, however, usually confine matters of justice 
and the legal status of the poor to legal clinics and a few courses 
and seminars that concern legal philosophy, poverty, race, gender, 
or disability.  To this extent, the subject of poverty and the law in 
today’s law schools is ghettoized.
  Law schools, however, 
can and should do more to offer all students a different path to 
travel through the law and through life—a path along which coin is 
not the standard measure of either success or prestige.  This effort, 
however, should not be directed principally for the benefit of 
students who have already chosen not to pursue coin as their 
reward.  No, the effort must be directed for the benefit of all law 
school students as well as the institutional health of the law school 
itself.  This requires making justice a concern for all lawyers and 
elevating justice as a central concern of legal education. 
71  No doubt, clinical education 
today is a component of virtually every law school curriculum,72
 
 69. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 65, at 354–55; Quigley, supra note 39, at 9–11.  
There is evidence, however, that a substantial number of students enter law school 
imbued with idealism and a high level of interest in social justice.  See Tan N. 
Nguyen, An Affair to Forget: Law School’s Deleterious Effect on Student’s Public Interest 
Aspirations, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 251, 256 (2008) (examining why the level of 
interest in public interest work among law students declines by the final year of law 
school and arguing one reason for the decline in student interest in public 
interest law careers is that “[l]aw school faculty often explicitly convey a negative 
image of what it means to practice public interest law to their students.”). 
 70. Rose, supra note 66, at 447–48; Vladeck, supra note 65, at 355.  See also Jill 
Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law 
School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (1993) (noting that content of law school 
course offerings signals a heavy corporate bias, which serves to guide the flow of 
the  majority of students into corporate law). 
 71. See Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 586 (“Clinics are not integrated 
into the mainstream curriculum. . . . [and] [i]n effect the law school division 
between clinical and non-clinical education replicates the dual system of justice: 
law for the affluent as distinct from law for the poor, the mainstream curriculum 
as distinct from the clinical curriculum.”). 
 but 
 72. See DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., REPORT ON THE 2007–2008 SURVEY (2008), available at 
http://www.csale.org/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf [hereinafter CSALE 
SURVEY].  The CSALE Survey sought a range of information on law school clinical 
and field placement programs from all 188 ABA fully accredited law schools.  Id. at 
1–2.  Survey responses were received from 145 schools.  Id. at 1.  Both overall 
enrollment at each responding school and clinical enrollment information was 
collected.  Id. at 2.  See also James H. Backman, Practical Examples for Establishing an 
Externship Program Available to Every Student, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 1,  4–11 (2007) 
(providing an overview of in-house clinical programs and externship involvement, 
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most law school clinics give a relatively few number of students73 
limited exposure to the pressing legal plight and the many burdens 
that fill the lives of the poor, and even more limited exposure to 
examining the relationship between poverty and the law.74  That 
said, it should indeed be noted and celebrated that many law 
school clinics have done and continue to do enormously important 
social justice impact work, and many clinical programs provide 
invaluable individual representation both civilly and criminally.75  
But by and large, too few students can participate76 and too many 
schools and students view a clinical experience more as an 
opportunity to develop practice-ready skills than as an inquiry into 
the role and function of justice, or the confluence of poverty and 
the law.77
 
and explaining the growth in externship placements).  Professor Backman draws 
on data reported in the ABA and Law School Admission Council’s annual Official 
Guide to Law Schools.  Id. 
 73. CSALE SURVEY, supra note 72, at 10 (revealing that at many schools, only a 
relatively small percentage of enrolled students actually participate in live in-house 
clinics).  See also Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 586 (noting the lack of 
funding and personnel for current law school clinical programs). 
 74. See Meredith J. Ross, A “Systems” Approach to Clinical Legal Education, 
13 CLINICAL L. REV. 779, 779–81 (2007) (explaining a fundamental debate in 
clinical education is whether the goal of a clinical program should be skills 
acquisition or social justice); Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 327, 327–28 (2001) (explaining the “proper objective of clinical legal 
education is to teach students about using the law to pursue social justice . . . .  
[and that] client-centered legal services work is as important a way of teaching 
about social justice as law reform litigation.”). 
 75. See Scharf, supra note 38, at 243–46 (noting the successes of the Southern 
New England School of Law Immigration Law Clinic).  See also BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, 
STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BUNCH OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT—
AND WON 307 (Scribner 2005) (chronicling human rights litigation prosecuted by 
law students at Yale Law School under Professor Harold Koh, and describing how 
in 2001, Professor Koh told a new group of clinical students at the first meeting 
that “[t]his course . . . is about saving people.  And not just people you’ll be 
helping, but all of you.”); Arturo J. Carillo, Bringing International Law Home: The 
Innovative Role of Human Rights Clinics in the Transitional Legal Process, 35 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2004) (analyzing the successes of human rights law school 
clinics); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-
Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 237 (2003) (noting most clinical programs 
provide individual direct representation and noting a number of instances of law 
school clinics doing controversial impact cases); Jan Stiglitz, Justin Brooks & Tara 
Shulman, The Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects New Emerging Role in 
Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 413 (2002) (discussing the successes of 
the California Innocence Project). 
 76. Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 586.  See also CSALE SURVEY, supra 
note 72, at 7. 
 
 77. Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 591–92.  See also Sameer M. Ashar, 
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There remains the question why a subject that in the words of 
Justice Scalia is “made-up,”78 should occupy such a coveted space in 
today’s law school curriculum, let alone support a new and 
controversial institutional mission?  This question in some measure 
touches upon the problem of defining poverty law.  First, it should 
be pointed out that Justice Scalia’s criticism rests on the premise 
that courses that he would consider serious are not made-up.  
However, that premise is flawed because the schema of our 
common law system is, so to speak, all made-up in the first instance.79
You can quite literally throw a dart at a historical map of the 
common law to demonstrate this point.  Whether the subject is 
administrative law, tort law, environmental law, consumer law, 
constitutional law, remedies, civil procedure, property law, 
corporations or any other subject area, “made-up stuff” is what gives 
these and all other doctrinal areas of study content and continuing 
vitality.  Consider how Justice Scalia’s criticism fares against the 
development and evolution of strict liability law.
 
80  Just more made-
up stuff?  The concept of minimum contacts as a central organizing 
principle in the ordering of personal jurisdictional concerns,81 and 
the Mathews v. Eldridge due process three-factor balancing test,82 
and equal protection scrutiny analysis in constitutional law,83
Admittedly, a lack of commonly recognized or agreed 
substantive boundaries denies poverty law the status of a neatly 
fenced-off doctrinal subject area.  Poverty law, however, as either an 
 are all 
informed by what could readily be labeled as “made-up stuff.” 
 
Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 357 (2008) (arguing 
that “[p]oor people are not served well by the kinds of advocacy currently taught 
and reinforced in most law clinics.”). 
 78. Pallasch, supra note 2. 
 79. See Roger J. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 52 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., Columbia 
Univ. Press 1959) (stating “[e]very basic precedent was thus once made up out of 
whole cloth woven by a judge.”); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 247, 249 (2003) (discussing how courts by default “are inventing 
health law.”). 
 80. See generally Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., Justice Roger J. Traynor and the 
Development of Strict Liability in Product Liability Cases, 53 CONN. B.J. 423 (1979) 
(analyzing Justice Traynor’s development of strict liability in the context of 
defective products). 
 81. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 82. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 83. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660–61 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing majority’s use of fundamental rights strict-scrutiny 
analysis). 
17
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area of study or an area of practice, has never been clothed with 
tradition or simplicity.  But these facts should present neither an 
instructional obstacle nor a pedagogical justification for not 
incorporating such a course into the required curriculum.  It 
matters not so much precisely what a particular course’s fine details 
are as much as that the course places squarely before students the 
taunting symmetries of the law.  The purpose of requiring students 
to take a poverty law course is to expose them to the complexity of 
the legal interests of the poor, the promise of the law as an 
institution capable of addressing and remediating injustice, and the 
richness of lawyering on behalf of the poor in a nation committed 
by its written constitution to equal justice.84
Because a picture is worth a thousand words, I draw upon my 
own recent experience in teaching poverty law in a classroom 
setting to sketch a few illustrations of how professors can teach 
students both competency and expose students to the taunting 
symmetries of the law.  One of the cases I assign in my poverty law 
class is Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker.
 
85  In 
Rucker, the Supreme Court held that a statutory provision that 
Congress enacted, and which amended the National Housing Act, 
permits the eviction of an innocent public housing tenant when 
another member of the tenant’s family, guest, or other person 
under the tenant’s control has engaged in drug-related criminal 
activity.86  Using the Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court found 
that Congress indeed intended to allow the eviction of innocent 
tenants for the drug offenses of other persons and that the eviction 
of innocent tenants does not present any constitutional problems.87
 
 84. See generally E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., Walking Against the Wind, 38 
NLADA BRIEFCASE, 10–11 (Summer 1981) (explaining the challenges and rewards 
of lawyering for the nation’s poor). 
 85. 535 U.S. 125 (2001). 
 86. Id. at 130.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2005).  Following Rucker, the 
statute was amended in a number of ways.  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)(A)–(E) (2005).  
The statute still permits eviction as authorized under Rucker but offers protections 
for tenants, their family members, and guests or other persons under a tenant’s 
control who are victims of domestic violence.  Id.  The domestic violence 
exception to the statute has its limits.  If the domestic violence poses an actual and 
imminent threat to other tenants or employees, the statute permits the housing 
authority to terminate the tenant’s lease.  Id. 
 87. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 136.  The Supreme Court first established the Chevron 
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I devote one class session to studying and exploring the legal 
analysis in Rucker and a second class session on how it bears on the 
interests of the poor and the abilities of lawyers to protect those 
interests.  The first class includes a conventional exploration of the 
facts and discussion of the Court’s legal analysis and the arguments 
raised by the parties.  The discussion includes an examination of 
the Court’s application of the Chevron doctrine, how it differed 
from the Ninth Circuit’s application, and the Court’s rejection of 
the tenants’ due process concerns.88  Fortunately, one or more 
students in the class always believe that the Court correctly decided 
the case, that it was a fair decision, and that Congress has the right 
to take tough measures to combat crime and drugs, especially when 
the government provides a family housing.  From there, I move to a 
discussion of the 1986 Florida Supreme Court decision in Florida 
Bar v. Rosen.89
In Rosen, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of 
a three-year suspension given to a Florida attorney who had been 
convicted of cocaine drug-trafficking charges.
 
90  The Florida Bar 
disagreed with the referee’s recommendation for a three-year 
suspension and pressed for disbarment on appeal.91  The Florida 
Supreme Court, however, found disbarment too severe under the 
circumstances of the case.92  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
explained that the “facts illustrat[ed] yet another tragedy related to 
cocaine abuse.”93  Central to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rosen was the attorney’s accomplishments in law school, his skill 
and reputation as a tax lawyer, his authorship of articles on tax 
matters, and his involvement as a lecturer in continuing legal 
education programs.94
    As is so often the case, Rosen’s productivity as a 
member of society precipitously plummeted as he became 
increasingly addicted to free-base cocaine.  To his credit, 
he quietly wound up his law practice towards the end of 
1981, when he no longer felt able to adequately protect 
  The Florida Supreme Court then 
contextualized the lawyer’s loss of control and involvement in drug 
trafficking: 
 
 88. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130, 135–36. 
 89. 495 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1986). 
 90. Id. at 181. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. 
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the best interests of his clients.  Unfortunately, however, 
he had by then lost the ability to exercise such care for 
himself, and continued to withdraw into the nightmarish 
nether-world of cocaine addiction until he finally became 
involved in drug trafficking in 1982.95
Unlike the Florida Supreme Court in Rosen, the United States 
Supreme Court in Rucker was far less forgiving of the troubles of 
sixty-three-year-old Pearlie Rucker and her adult disabled daughter 
who was arrested for possession of crack cocaine several blocks 
from Pearlie’s Oakland Housing Authority apartment complex.
 
96  
Pearlie Rucker had called the Oakland Housing Authority complex 
home for almost two decades, but unlike the attorney in Rosen, she 
had no professional standing or accomplishments that were 
highlighted by the Court.97  More immediately, however, unlike the 
attorney in Rosen, Rucker herself was entirely innocent.98
The class is then asked to consider and compare the treatment 
of Pearlie Rucker and her disabled daughter with the treatment of 
the twenty-four-year-old daughter of former Florida Governor Jeb 
Bush, who a few months before the Rucker decision had been 
arrested for attempting to buy the drug Xanax with a fraudulent 
prescription.
 
The contrast between how Rucker and Rosen treated drug use 
and drug-related criminal activity could not be sharper.  Using that 
contrast, I ask the class to consider “why?”  Was it because Rucker 
was poor and black and Rosen was white and a member of a 
privileged profession?  How, if at all, did poverty burden the 
decisional outcome in Rucker?  How did Pearlie Rucker’s status as a 
poor American influence the result in her case?  Do the ethics of 
drug use turn on a person’s station in life? 
99  Within hours of his daughter’s arrest, Governor 
Bush asked the public to respect his privacy, and quickly thereafter, 
his daughter entered a drug treatment program.100
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 97. See id. at 1113–42. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Dana Canedy, Jeb Bush’s Daughter Is Arrested on Charge of Faking Prescription, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A12. 
 100. Id. 
  The class 
materials for Rucker also include an article that details Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist’s own struggle with dependence on and misuse 
of the prescription sedative Placidyl during his tenure on the 
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Supreme Court.101
Next, I ask the class why Congress does not craft a one-strike 
policy for homeowners who claim a mortgage interest deduction 
on their federal income tax statement.
  I ask the class if these comparisons are fair and 
whether they are in any way relevant or revelatory about how we 
treat the poor differently in terms of legal rights and legal burdens. 
102  I ask why not implement 
a policy that bars any taxpayer from claiming the mortgage interest 
deduction if any member of the family, a guest, or other person 
subject to a family member’s control, engages in drug-related 
activity.  As in cases of public housing tenants who face eviction, 
there would be no innocent homeowner defense and the person 
accused of drug-related activity need not be convicted to trigger the 
one-strike policy.103  These questions seek to encourage students to 
think about how the same or similar conduct can be viewed and 
treated in radically different ways depending on the affected party’s 
social and economic status.104
Following an examination of these issues, I ask the students to 
consider how they would defend a public housing client facing 
eviction based on the drug-related or criminal activity of another 
person, perhaps a child or guest.  I return to a discussion of Rucker 
to try and get the students to think about how they would defend a 





 101. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in Rucker.  See Alan 
Copperman, Sedative Withdrawal Made Rehnquist Delusional in ’81, WASH. POST, Jan. 
5, 2007, at A1.  See also David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000) 
(documenting Justice Rehnquist’s overdependence on Placidyl). 
 102. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and 
Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 673 (2002) (“The tax advantages associated with 
home ownership are by far the largest federal housing subsidies, many times 
greater than the housing subsidies for low-income people.”). 
 103. Under 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (2001), a housing authority may 
evict a tenant based on a covered person’s (family member, guest, or other person 
under the tenant’s control) criminal activity “regardless of whether the covered 
person has been arrested or convicted for such activity and without satisfying the 
standard of proof used for a criminal conviction.” 
 104. See, e.g., Robert Hornstein, Treena Kaye, & Daniel Atkins, One Strike for the 
Poor and How Many for the Rest of Us?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 66. 
 105. Rucker v. Davis, 535 U.S. at 134.  See also Tamara R. Piety, The War on the 
Poor—News from the Front: Department of Housing and Urban Development v. 
Rucker, 38 TULSA L. REV. 385 (2002).  See also Robert Hornstein, Mean Things 
Happening in This Land: Defending Third Party Criminal Activity Public Housing 
Evictions, 23 S.U. L. REV. 257, 266 (1996). 
  I ask them, “in light of Rucker, what defenses 
remain available?”  In Rucker, the Supreme Court noted that the 
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regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development confer discretion on local public housing authorities 
to decide whether an eviction should be prosecuted.106
After exhausting an examination of what, if any, traditional 
defenses remain available,
  We then 
discuss whether an abuse of that discretion gives rise to a defense 
based on the regulation conferring such discretion.  In the course 
of the discussion, we examine the usefulness of requesting a jury 
trial in these types of evictions. 
107
Rucker, however, offers but one example of how poverty law 
issues can inform instruction.  In the context of contracts, the use 
of remedy-stripping provisions that compel a forfeiture of jury trial 
rights, waive or limit damage remedies, restrict the recovery of costs 
and fees, or shift liability for fees and costs,
 I ask them to prepare a voir dire 
examination for the next class.  In that second class, I conduct a 
voir dire exercise based on a post-Rucker criminal activity eviction.  
For this exercise, I have the entire class serve as the venire panel.  
Individual students take turns conducting a voir dire examination 
of the class either as counsel for the housing authority or as counsel 
for the tenant.  The class, however, is told that they are to wear two 
hats, one as a member of the venire panel and one as opposing 
counsel.  The exercise permits any student to tender an objection 
to a question posed by the student conducting the voir dire 
examination.  Using Rucker as the legal framework, this jury 
selection exercise brings to the fore issues of class, social status, 
bias, and, very clearly, the concrete burdens that the law places on 
an impoverished tenant.  Students are confronted with the 
practical difficulties that inhere in defending the poor, including 
trying to fashion a viable defense and selecting a jury that will sit in 
judgment on a poor person’s legal rights. 
108 and the use and 
application of the doctrine of unconscionability,109
 
 106. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 129, 134.  See also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(l)(i) (2001) 
(codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)vii(B)–(D) (2008)). 
 107. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Garcia, 871 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Mass. 2007) 
(holding special circumstances defense under state law was preempted, but the 
court left open the possibility a tenant could defend on the basis of an abuse of 
discretion defense). 
 108. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: 
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 50 (2003). 
 109. See, e.g., Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112–13 (N.J. 2006).   
 offer many types 
of opportunities to examine poverty law issues.  Professor Paul 
Carrington, in his article Unconscionable Lawyers, argues that lawyers 
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have a duty to avoid using oppressive remedy-stripping clauses.110  
Carrington explores the contours of the duty, the potential for 
substantive liability, and the moral restraints on lawyers drafting 
and invoking oppressive remedy-stripping clauses.111
We first examine the ethical question through the prism of the 
lawyer’s duty to his client.  The client might be a rent-to-own 
furniture company, a used car dealer, a bank, or a private landlord.  
Next, I ask the class to consider what, if any, duty exists to third 
parties and to the public.  I narrow the question to focus on the 
ethical implications of lawyers invoking provisions that, by design, 
are intended to deny persons access to the courts, deprive them of 
important procedural rights, and foreclose any meaningful judicial 
remedies.  The class materials include selected Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct.
  I assign the 
article and ask the students to consider the ethical implications of 
the use of these types of contract provisions.  I pose the question in 
the context of a hypothetical representation.  Professor 
Carrington’s article and his arguments offer a rich opportunity to 
examine a wealth of issues, including the proper role and 
responsibilities of lawyers as advocates, the impact of remedy-
stripping devices on the poor’s access to the courts, and the proper 
role and function of the courts in enforcing these types of 
provisions. 
112
Next, the class is asked whether the rules have any application.  
In this context, we explore how these types of remedy-stripping 
provisions burden or benefit the adjudicative process and how they 
burden the ability of persons to defend lawsuits or to press claims 
for affirmative relief.  We also consider how wealth and poverty 
bear on the enforcement and efficacy of these provisions.  I ask the 
class how, if at all, remedy-stripping provisions weigh more heavily 
on the poor than on others whose rights are similarly burdened or 
extinguished by the use of such provisions.  The discussion forces 
students to reconcile a number of competing professional 
obligations and moral impulses.  Professor Carrington’s insights 
   
 
 110. Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 361–
62 (2002). 
 111. Id. at 364, 370, 379, 384, 391. 
 112. See FLA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-3.4 (fairness to opposing party); FLA. R. 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-4.4 (respect for the rights of third persons); FLA. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4-8.4 (conduct classified as misconduct).  The Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct are found in Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida 
Bar. 
23
Hornstein: Teaching Law Students to Comfort the Troubled and Trouble the Com
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
1080 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
place in sharp relief for students the moral dimensions of their 
responsibilities as lawyers, the limits of zealous advocacy, and also 
how wealth and poverty can weigh heavily on the calculus of justice. 
A poverty law course offers virtually unbounded opportunities 
to examine questions of justice and equality within the crucible of 
practical lawyering concerns.  But these opportunities are not 
confined exclusively to a classroom poverty law course.  Professor 
Failinger explains that “the ways in which poverty law can be 
infused into the life of a law school that trains its students to be 
public citizens are manifold.”113  There are just as many 
opportunities to build poverty law issues and concerns into 
conventional courses such as torts, property law, remedies and 
virtually any other course.114  In property courses, landlord-tenant 
statutory schemes that favor property owners and disadvantage the 
poor offer useful teaching tools to examine poverty law issues.115  
Tort law and tort reform implicate a range of poverty law concerns, 
including the disparate impact that damage limitations have on the 
poor and minorities.116
Returning to Justice Scalia, in 2008, he sat for an interview with 
C-Span founder Brian Lamb to promote his book on legal writing, 
Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges, which he co-authored 
with Professor Bryan Garner.
  Poverty law and social justice concerns 
need not be ghettoized—they can be a vital and integral part of the 
law school curriculum. 
117  During the course of the interview, 
Justice Scalia was asked how he would rate lawyers who have 
appeared in the Supreme Court.118
 
 113. Failinger, supra note 62, at 1188. 
 114. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Symposium, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure: 
Rethinking the First-Year Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1325, 1325 (2007) (examining 
“whether and how to integrate issues of poverty and inequality into the standard 
first-year course on civil procedure.”). 
 115. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72–73 (1972). 
 116. Joanne Doroshow & Amy Widman, The Racial Implications of Tort Reform, 
25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161, 161–62 (2007).  See also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS 
MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111–51 (2002) (asking if Helen Palsgraf’s poverty could have 
been a decisive factor in the outcome of her famous 1928 case, Palsgraf v. Long 
Island Railroad Company, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)); Susan Carle & Michelle 
Lapointe, Short Notes on Teaching About the Micro-Politics of Class, With Examples from 
Torts and Employment Law Casebooks, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1129 (2008). 
 117. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF 
PERSUADING JUDGES (West Law School 2008). 
 118. Q&A: Justice Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.q-and-
a.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1178 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
  His answer to that question 
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offers yet another measure of insight into how he values the legal 
interests of the poor: 
Now and then you get somebody who’s really quite bad, 
but more often I am startled by the fact that this young 
woman who is a, you know, public defender from Podunk 
is so good, is so smart, and is so competent, and I ask 
myself, “What is she doing, you know, being a public defender in 
Podunk?  Why isn’t she out inventing the automobile or, 
you know, doing something useful?”  I mean, I – you 
know, I’m being sarcastic, I suppose, but it is the fact that 
we devote, in my view, too many of our best and brightest 
minds to the law.119
Justice Scalia’s suggestion, that lawyers who devote their lives 
to the cause of justice by representing the poor and the 
disenfranchised in small and out-of-the-way towns and cities across 
the country are not doing important work that benefits society, 
offers a cramped understanding of the promise of our legal 
institutions.  An eloquent rejoinder to Justice Scalia’s questioning 
of why a lawyer might want to serve the poor in an obscure corner 
of the country was offered almost thirty years ago by Professor 
Clinton Bamberger in his commencement address to the 1981 
graduating class of the School of Law of the University of 
Pennsylvania.
 
120  Bamberger explained to the gathered students 
and their families and friends: “[t]he best of a lawyer’s work is to 
create with the law.  The best of this work is to find in law rights, 
dignity, and status and to free these forces for people who would 
not have them but for the law and your application.”121
Last fall I had two guest speakers in my poverty law class, both 
of whom are poverty lawyers.  Gregory Schell has spent three 
decades in rural communities in Florida and on the Delmarva 
Peninsula helping assert rights for and give dignity to thousands of 




 119. Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. Bamberger, supra note 84, at 10. 
 121. Id. at 11. 
 122. In 2004, Schell was the recipient of the National Legal Aid & Defender 
Association’s prestigious Reginald Heber Smith Award.  Press Release, Nat’l Legal 
Aid and Defender Org., Gregory Schell Nationally Honored for Outstanding Work 
on Behalf of Migrant Farmworkers (2004), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/News/News_Press_Releases/2004110533281567.  Schell 
was recognized for his many years of effective advocacy on behalf of the nation’s 
farm workers.  Id. 
  Miriam Harmatz, for nearly 
the same amount of time, has fought tirelessly to expand 
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healthcare access for the poor in Florida and to protect their rights 
under the Medicaid Program.  Harmatz has used her legal skills 
and intellect to give both hope and better health to thousands of 
sick and impoverished men, women, and children throughout 
Florida.123
Greg Schell’s personal connection to Chief Justice John 
Roberts has stayed with me, perhaps because both men clearly have 
brilliant legal minds and have been accomplished and gifted 
lawyers, yet each chose different paths in the law.
  In November, Harmatz brought to life the byzantine 
provisions of the federal Medicaid statute through the compelling 
narratives of the poorest and sickest Floridians’ struggles to survive. 
Schell, who is the Managing Attorney of Florida Legal Services, 
Inc.’s Migrant Farmworker Justice Project in Lake Worth, Florida, 
spoke to the class in September of 2008 about the importance of 
legal counsel and the ways in which the poor’s access to legal 
counsel has been burdened.  Following class, two students and I 
took him out for lunch.  On the way back, Greg Schell shared that 
Chief Justice John Roberts was his classmate at Harvard Law 
School, a very nice man, and one of the smartest persons he knew. 
124  I suppose it is 
the symmetry of their gifted legal minds and the asymmetry of their 
career choices.  Like Robert Frost’s two roads that diverged in a 
wood,125
The place and role of poverty law in today’s law school 
curriculum is to ensure that more students take what has 
traditionally been the road less travelled, and to ensure that all law 
students understand the direct and immediate relationship 
between poverty and injustice, including how both burden 
 Greg Schell took the road less travelled, and for thousands 
of the nation’s impoverished farm workers, that has made all the 
difference. 
 
 123. Miriam Harmatz was a co-recipient of the Florida Bar Foundation’s 2006 
Steven M. Goldstein Award for her work on an advocacy project aimed at insuring 
that impoverished Floridians receive medically necessary medications authorized 
under federal law and that their due process rights are protected.  See generally 
2006 Steven M. Goldstein Award for Excellence, http://www.floridalegal.org/ 
News/Goldstein%20Awards/Rx%20project.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).  The 
advocacy included both legislative advocacy and class action litigation.  Id.  Both 
Harmatz and Schell work for Florida Legal Services, Inc., a nonprofit legal 
organization that provides a range of legal services to Florida’s poor.  See generally 
Florida Legal Services, Inc. http://www.floridalegal.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
 124. Greg Schell has litigated numerous federal decisions that have benefited 
tens of thousands of migrant workers across the nation.  See, e.g., Arriaga v. Fla. 
Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 125. ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (1915). 
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democracy.126  For this reason, it remains vitally important that 
there continue to be calls for law schools to embrace a social justice 
mission.  It matters not whether such calls are targeted with 
humility127 or raised as a social call to arms.128
 
 126. Rose, supra note 66, at 446 (“Access to our legal system represents access 
to one of the . . . vital organs of American democracy.”). 
 127. Failinger, supra note 62, at 1175. 
 128. William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the Root Causes of 
Poverty and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 162 (2006). 
  There is room for 
both approaches in the discourse.  What matters most is that, as a 
nation, we continue to strive to give greater content to the meaning 
and understanding of equal justice.  That important undertaking 
rightfully should be a principal responsibility of our law schools. 
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